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How do people judge the degree of causal responsibility that an agent has for
the outcomes of her actions? We show that a relatively unexplored factor – the
robustness (or stability) of the causal chain linking the agent’s action and the outcome –
influences judgments of causal responsibility of the agent. In three experiments, we vary
robustness by manipulating the number of background circumstances under which
the action causes the effect, and find that causal responsibility judgments increase
with robustness. In the first experiment, the robustness manipulation also raises the
probability of the effect given the action. Experiments 2 and 3 control for probability-
raising, and show that robustness still affects judgments of causal responsibility.
In particular, Experiment 3 introduces an Ellsberg type of scenario to manipulate
robustness, while keeping the conditional probability and the skill deployed in the action
fixed. Experiment 4, replicates the results of Experiment 3, while contrasting between
judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility. The results show that in all
cases, the perceived degree of responsibility (but not of causal strength) increases with
the robustness of the action-outcome causal chain.
Keywords: causality and responsibility, attributions of responsibility, robust causation, causal contingency and
stability, epistemic perspective
INTRODUCTION
The causal responsibility an agent has for the effects of her actions is thought to play a major role
in the attribution of the agent’s legal, moral and even criminal responsibility (Hart and Honoré,
1959; Tadros, 2005; Moore, 2009; Lagnado and Gerstenberg, 2017; Usher, 2018). Indeed, causal
responsibility is a necessary condition for the ascription of legal responsibility (Hart and Honoré,
1959; Tadros, 2005). Research in moral psychology has identified general cognitive processes such
as causal and intentional attributions to explain patterns of responsibility judgments in both moral
and non-moral domains (Cushman and Young, 2011; see also Spranca et al., 1991; Royzman and
Baron, 2002; Mikahil, 2007; Waldmann and Dieterich, 2007; Lagnado and Channon, 2008; Baron
and Ritov, 2009; Greene et al., 2009). For example, Cushman and Young (2011) show that action
versus omission and means versus side-effect differences in moral judgments are mediated by their
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effects on non-moral representations of causal and intentional
attributions.1 Similarly, Mikahil (2007) accounts for the means
versus side-effect distinction in terms of action plans which
specify generic rather than morally specific reasoning (see
also Kleiman-Weiner et al., 2015). Furthermore, the reduced
judgments of responsibility people typically make for agents
who were forced to act or were manipulated by others
(Sripada, 2012; Phillips and Shaw, 2015) are best accounted
for by the manipulation “bypassing” the agent’s mental states
(Murray and Lombrozo, 2017). To explain these results, Murray
and Lombrozo (2017) relied on the notion of counterfactual
robustness, which is central to our investigation and on which we
elaborate below.
While causation is basic in all sciences, its proper
understanding has been the subject of intensive recent
development and debate in philosophy (Pearl, 2000; Woodward,
2003; Hitchcock, 2007; Halpern, 2016). A key distinction is
between type and token level causation. The former applies
to laws and generalizations (such as smoking causes cancer),
while the latter applies to particular cases (John’s smoking
caused his cancer). The concept of causal responsibility is
typically grounded in the notion of token (or actual) causation.
This means that to know that an agent is causally responsible
for an effect, we need to know that she actually caused it (in
that particular case). However, while the classical analysis of
actual causation is based on a necessity counterfactual – if C
had not occurred, then E would not have occurred (Hume,
1748; Lewis, 1973) – which is an all-or-none concept (the
counterfactual is either true or false) – judgments of causal and
legal responsibility are graded. For example, an agent generally
bears more responsibility for an effect that is a direct outcome
of her action, than for an effect that results at the end of a long
causal chain (Brickman et al., 1975; Spellman, 1997; McClure
et al., 2007; Lagnado and Channon, 2008; Hilton et al., 2010).
This is aptly illustrated in the Regina v. Faulkner (1877) legal
case, in which a lit match aboard a ship caused a cask of rum to
ignite, causing the ship to burn and resulting in a large financial
loss by Lloyd’s insurance, leading to the suicide of a (financially
ruined) insurance executive.2
Experimental studies of actual causation have also shown that
judgments of causal strength and of causal responsibility vary
with the typicality of the cause and the background conditions
(Hilton and Slugoski, 1986; Kominsky et al., 2015; Samland and
Waldmann, 2016; Icard et al., 2017; Gerstenberg et al., 2018)
and also with the degree of causal redundancy (Gerstenberg
and Lagnado, 2010; Zultan et al., 2012; Lagnado et al., 2013;
Gerstenberg et al., 2015; Koskuba et al., 2018). For example,
Kominsky et al. (2015) show that people are more likely to
endorse an event (Alex’s coin-flip coming up heads) as causally
responsible for another event (Alex wins the game), when the
contingency between the two is high (Alex wins if both the coin
1These two causal responsibility patterns are as follows: (i) Harm brought about by
an action is deemed morally worse than harm brought about by an omission. (ii)
People judge harm used as the necessary means to a goal to be worse than harm
produced as the foreseen side-effect of a goal (Cushman and Young, 2011).
2The executive’s widow sued for compensation, but it was ruled that the negligence
of lighting the match was not a cause of his death.
comes up heads and the sum of two dice being thrown is greater
than 2) than when the contingency between the two events is
low (Alex wins if both the coin comes up heads and the sum
of two dice being thrown is greater than 11). Also, when there is
causal redundancy, for example, when the action of several agents
overdetermines an outcome (e.g., two marksmen are shooting a
person; Lagnado et al., 2013), the responsibility of each agent is
reduced the more overdetermined the outcome is.
The interventionist framework (Pearl, 2000; Woodward,
2003) provides a general framework for understanding causal
claims at both type and token level (we focus on the latter here).
On this approach, X causes Y if some potential manipulation
of X would lead to a change in Y, under suitable background
conditions (for full details see Woodward, 2003). Theoretical
work within this framework has highlighted two ways to extend
the classical analysis of causality to provide room for degrees
of causal responsibility. The first involves a refinement of the
necessity condition (Chockler and Halpern, 2004; Halpern and
Hitchcock, 2015), which suggests that necessity is to be tested not
only on counterfactuals that negate the cause and keep all other
co-factors constant, but also on counterfactuals that can vary
some of these co-factors. For example, in situations of redundant
causation (e.g., two marksmen shooting a person), neither of the
agents’ actions is necessary for the outcome (either shot on its
own was sufficient to kill the victim, so the victim would still
have died, even if one of the marksmen hadn’t shot). However,
if we allow for a more flexible type of counterfactual test, where
one marksman’s action is assessed under the contingency where
the other marksman does not shoot, then both marksmen can be
counted as causes of the victim’s death. Moreover, this extended
counterfactual account fits with empirical data on graded causal
judgments (Zultan et al., 2012; Lagnado et al., 2013).
The second way to introduce gradations of causal judgments
involves a complementary causal condition: robust sufficiency
(Lewis, 1973; Pearl, 1999; Woodward, 2006; Lombrozo, 2010;
Hitchcock, 2012; Kominsky et al., 2015; Icard et al., 2017;
Usher, 2018; Vasilyeva et al., 2018). Focusing on the simplest
case, where we have one putative cause X of an effect Y, and
a set of background circumstances B: X is robustly sufficient
for Y if, given that X occurs, Y would still occur, even under
various changes to the background circumstances. In contrast,
the sufficiency of X for Y is non-robust (or highly sensitive) if,
given X, Y would only occur under a very specific (narrow)
set of background circumstances. Thus, we have a spectrum
of degrees of robustness according to the range of background
circumstances under which X would remain sufficient (i.e., be
pivotal) for Y. This notion of robustness can be generalized to
more complicated situations involving multiple causal factors
(see Gerstenberg et al., 2015; Kominsky et al., 2015), and also
to non-deterministic contexts where causes merely raise the
probability of their effects (Hitchcock, 2017). Applied to the
case of Regina vs. Faulkner, the causal chain from the lit match
to the suicide of the insurance executive seems non-robust
(and highly sensitive): it held only under this very specific set
of background circumstances, and would have failed if only
one of these factors had been different (see also Halpern and
Hitchcock, 2015). Robust actions, on the other hand, are thought
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to involve some degree of stability (low sensitivity) on the impact
of background circumstances that are external to the action itself
(Woodward, 2006).
Robust Sufficiency Versus Probability
Raising
An alternative framework for quantifying causal strength
employs the notion of probability-raising (Suppes, 1970; Cheng
and Novick, 1992; Spellman, 1997; Fitelson and Hitchcock,
2011), where the strength of the relation between cause and
effect corresponds to the degree to which the cause raises the
probability of the effect (holding all else equal). This account
usually focuses on type-level causal relations (Cheng, 1997), but
has been extended to actual causation (Spellman, 1997; Cheng
and Novick, 2005; Stephan and Waldmann, 2018). Although the
framework suffers from notorious difficulties in distinguishing
correlation from causation (Cartwright, 1989; Woodward, 2003;
Pearl, 2009), it can be revamped to give a potential measure of
causal strength (e.g., probability-raising through intervention).
While robust causes will often raise the probability of their
effects more than non-robust causes, robustness and probability-
raising are potentially distinguishable. For example, suppose that
a doctor considers two possible drugs to treat a difficult medical
condition that has a 20% chance of recovery if untreated. Drug X
has a success rate of 60% in two possible background conditions
(B1 and B2, whose presence is difficult to establish), while drug-
Y has a 100% recovery in B1, but only 20% in B2. Overall, if we
assume that B1 and B2 are equally probable, then both drugs yield
the same recovery rate of (60% + 60%)/2 = (80% + 20%)/2 = 60%.3
However, Drug X is more robust, because the relation between
X and recovery holds under a greater number of background
conditions, (B1 and B2 for X versus only B1 for Y). We will exploit
this kind of example to de-confound robustness and probability-
raising in our two latest experiments (3 and 4) that focus on the
causal-responsibility of an agent for the effects of her actions,
using a design similar to one recently employed by Vasilyeva
et al. (2018), in the context of causal generalizations and causal
explanations. Note that defining robust-sufficiency in terms of
the number of background circumstances, rather than in terms
of probability raising, has two important advantages. First, an
agent may know of different background circumstances which
moderate the relationship between the cause and the effect, but
not have information about the probabilities with which those
background circumstances occur (or about the probabilities of
the effect conditional on the cause in those circumstances) and,
hence may not have the information to make reliable judgments
of probability raising. In such cases, the agent may still be guided
by an estimate of the number of different circumstances in which
the cause leads to the effect — that is, the robustness of the
cause/effect relationship. Second, there are theoretical reasons
to prefer causal relations that are invariant in various ways, in
particular invariant to changes in background conditions (Cheng,
3As the baseline recovery probability (without treatment) is fixed, the two
treatments also have the same impact in terms of 1P and causal-power (Cheng,
1997).
1997; Woodward, 2003).4 We will return to the distinction
between robustness and probability raising in the Discussion.
Judgments of Causation vs. Judgments
of Responsibility
Our interest here is in judgments of causal responsibility that
agents have for the outcomes of their actions, which are an
essential component of the type of responsibility that is involved
in judgments of praise and blame. While it is beyond the scope
of our paper to offer (or test) a full theory of praise/blame
(Malle et al., 2014; Halpern and Kleiman-Weiner, 2018), we note
that a common assumption is that there are two components
in credit/blame attribution: (i) an intentional one (the agent
needs to have intended and foreseen the outcome of her action
and the intention must not be the outcome of manipulation
by another agent; Lagnado and Channon, 2008; Sripada, 2012;
Phillips and Shaw, 2015), and (ii) a causal one: the agent must
be causally responsible for the outcome in virtue of an action
she did (or failed to do). In this study, we will only focus on
the second component, by keeping the intention present and
fixed. In that sense, our judgment of interest, causal-responsibility,
is similar to judgments of causal strength (but note that we
focus on judging the responsibility of agents for an outcome of
their actions). Probing causal strength typically asks “to what
extent X caused Y,” while probing causal responsibility asks “how
responsible is X for Y” (Sarin et al., 2017). Indeed, most studies in
the field have probed participants with either of these measures
with parallel effects (Murray and Lombrozo, 2017; Sarin et al.,
2017). Moreover, Sytsma et al. (2012) have proposed that “the
ordinary concept of causation, at least as applied to agents, is an
inherently normative concept: Causal attributions are typically
used to indicate something more akin to who is responsible for
a given outcome than who caused the outcome in the descriptive
sense of the term used by philosophers” (p. 815).
There are reasons, however, to expect that under certain
conditions, causal and responsibility judgments may diverge,
even when the agent’s intention is held constant (Chockler and
Halpern, 2004). Consider, for example, a doctor that administers
drug X (60% recovery in both B1 and B2; robust to background
conditions) or Y (100% recovery in B1 and 20% in B2; sensitive to
background conditions), in the example above, and assume that
the background circumstance B1 takes place (and B2 does not).
In such a case, we believe that there is a good reason to expect
a dissociation. While the causal strength between the doctor’s
action and the patient’s recovery is likely to be higher in the case
of drug Y (which in the actual circumstance, corresponding to
B1, increases the probability of the effect by 80%, compared with
an increase of only 40% for drug X), the causal responsibility
4As discussed in Woodward (2003), there are a variety of invariance conditions,
which a causal claim might satisfy. Robustness in the sense of invariance under
changes in background conditions is just one such requirement. Other invariance
requirements may be found, for example, in the characterization of causal power
(Cheng, 1997), which rests on the assumption that causes will (at least in simple
cases) conform to two invariance requirements — the power of the cause to
produce an effect should be invariant under changes in the frequency with which
the cause occurs and also invariant under changes in the frequency with which
other causes of the effect occur.
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attributed to the agent for the same event, is likely to be higher
for substance X, as X is more robust, and thus the outcome is less
sensitive to external circumstances. This distinction is consistent
with a recent theory of actual causation proposed by Chockler
and Halpern (2004), who distinguish between judgments of
causality, responsibility and blame. For example, they consider
the case of a person being shot by a firing squad of 10 marksmen,
only one of whom has a live bullet. According to Chockler
and Halpern, while only the marksman with the live bullet
caused the death of the person, the blame is divided between
all 10 marksmen, reflecting the epistemic uncertainty of the
marksmen agents. Here, we propose that judgments of causal
responsibility elicit the same epistemic perspective change as
those of blame. While this differs from the distinction made by
Chockler and Halpern, we believe that in the presence of the
intentional component5, the distinction between attributions of
blame/praise and causal responsibility is more subtle and thus
is beyond the scope of the present work. For that reason, we
group these two aspects (causal-responsibility and credit/blame)
together in this study.
There are two recent studies that are relevant, in particular, to
our present work. The former examined judgments of credit and
blame, which were shown to depend on two factors: (i) the degree
of causal redundancy (or pivotality) and (ii) the amount of skill
that people infer the agent to possess (Gerstenberg et al., 2018).
People attribute more credit to an agent when their action has
a higher contingency to the outcome, indicative of skill (rather
than luck), and when their action is pivotal for bringing about the
outcome. In another recent study, Vasilyeva et al. (2018) reported
an effect of stability on judgments of causal generalizations
and causal explanations for causal contingencies. In their study,
participants made judgments under conditions of uncertainty
about the factors that determine the causal contingency. Here, we
aim to contrast judgments of causal responsibility and of causal
strength for agents that bring about an effect in a robust vs. non-
robust manner. Moreover, we will focus on situations in which
the agents, but not the participants, face epistemic uncertainty.
This allows us to test the impact of robustness under situations
with minimum epistemic uncertainty (from the perspective of
the judging participant), as well as tease apart robustness, causal
strength, and causal responsibility (of agents for outcomes of
their actions). We defer a more detailed discussion of the
differences between our study and that of Vasilyeva et al. (2018)
to the General Discussion.
Overview of the Paper
This paper aims to empirically test the impact of robustness on
judgments of causal responsibility in human agency. To do so, in
all our experiments, we probe the extent to which a human agent
is judged to be causally responsible for the intended outcome
that resulted from her action. In Experiment 1 (which probes
both judgments of causal responsibility of causal strength), we
5Variations in this component can explain important differences between blame
and causal responsibility. For example, unlike an adult, a child who pokes at a
gun’s trigger out of curiosity will not be held culpable for resulting injury or death,
given reasonable assumptions about the lack of relevant intentions (Shafer, 2000;
Lagnado and Channon, 2008).
manipulate robustness in terms of the number of background
conditions under which the action would bring about the effect6,
and assess judgments of both causal responsibility and causal
strength. However, as noted, robustness is often correlated with
probability-raising, and Experiment 1 does not discriminate
between these two factors. Thus, Experiments 2–4 probe
causal responsibility and manipulate robustness while holding
probability-raising constant. Experiment 3 teases apart the effects
of robustness and skill on causal responsibility (Gerstenberg
et al., 2018), by holding the agents’ skill level constant, while
varying the robustness of their actions. Finally, in Experiment
4, we replicate Experiment 3 and extend the results to cases
of failure, contrasting judgments of causal responsibility and of
causal strength.
EXPERIMENT 1
In this experiment, we probe robustness by manipulating the
number of background conditions under which an action is likely
to result in a positive outcome. To do so, we designed a game
in which an agent throws a dart at a target to determine how
many dice will be rolled (one, two, or three) by a computer,
with the player winning the game if the sum total on the dice
is six or greater. The number of dice rolled (one, two, or three)
depends on the agent’s dart throw in the following way: if the
dart lands in one of the two inner circles (rings 5–6) three dice
are rolled, if it lands in one of the two middle circles (3–4), two
dice are rolled, and finally, if it lands in one of the two outer
circles (1–2), one die is rolled. While under all three contingencies
a win is possible, the degree of robustness increases with the
number of dice rolled.7 For the single die roll, there is only
one configuration (a six) resulting in a win. When two dice
are rolled, there are several more configurations that result in
a win (e.g., 6,1; 5,1; 4,2; etc.; 26 out of 36 possible outcomes),
and for three dice there are even more possible configurations
(e.g., 2,2,2; 1,4,5; etc.; 206 out of 216 possible outcomes). In
other words, the action (the dart throw) can cause the desired
outcome (winning) under more, or less, background conditions
(dice rolls). Observers in the experiment watched an animation in
which an agent first throws a dart which lands on one of the rings
(1–6) of the dartboard. After that, the corresponding number of
dice were “randomly” rolled, the outcome of the roll revealed,
and winning or losing declared. Half of the participants were
asked to evaluate the degree of responsibility of the agent for the
win/loss. The other half was asked to evaluate the causal strength
between the agent’s throw and the win/loss. In this experiment,
since robustness and probability raising co-vary, while the agent’s
6There are many contexts in which it is unclear how to count the “number of
background conditions” (see Phillips and Cushman, 2017). In such contexts, the
notion of robustness is not uniquely defined. However, in Experiment 1, there is a
very natural way of counting the number of relevant background conditions. The
number of background conditions is also well-defined when one set of background
circumstances is a proper subset of another.
7According to Woodward’s conceptualization, robustness depends on the number
of background conditions (BC) under which the desired outcome takes place,
given the action (Woodward, 2006). In this case, the relevant BCs are the possible
outcomes of the dice that equal or exceed 6.
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epistemic perspective is held constant, we expect attributions of
causal responsibility and causal strength to show similar patterns
(cf. Vasilyeva et al., 2018). In Experiment 4, we identify a context
in which the two measures dissociate.
We anticipated three possible patterns of results: (i) judgments
of responsibility/causal strength will not be affected by the
dart-ring outcome, implying that they are only sensitive to
the outcome (success or failure), (ii) judgments will increase
monotonically depending on which ring (1–6) the dart landed
in, implying that they are mainly determined by the agent’s
perceived skill, (iii) judgments will increase in two steps, from
ring 2 to 3, and from ring 4 to 5, implying that they are
determined by the robustness of the dart throw (action)/game-




One hundred and two participants (46 females, 56 males; mean
age = 33.7, SD = 9.7) took part in the experiment. Fifty of
whom rated how much the agent’s throw was a cause for
winning or losing. The other 52 participants rated the agent’s
responsibility for the result. All participants were recruited via
Amazon Mechanical Turk and received 1$ for participating.
Materials
Twenty video clips were created (see Figure 1 for illustration),
which varied in terms of the ring in which the dart lands (1–6),
the associated number of dice rolled (1–3), and the total score of
the dice (2–12). The profiles of each of the 20 clips are shown
in Table 1. Note that a total score of 6 or larger corresponds to
a win, and scores lower than 6 to a loss. Here, we focus on the
responsibility for success, but we included cases of failure in order
to balance success and failures to make the game credible. We also
constructed the set so that the total score of 6 (the critical value
for success) appears for all possible ring numbers and number
of dice thrown. This allows for a straightforward comparison of
the influence of these variables on people’s ratings. When more
than one dice was thrown, we included in addition winning cases
in which the total scores were 9 or 12 (# of dice = 2, and # of
dice = 3, respectively).
Procedure
After having received instructions, each participant watched the
20 clips in randomized order. For each clip, participants watched
a video showing a player throwing a dart toward the board, and
landing on one of the six rings (1–6). Depending on the result of
the dart throw, a number of dice (one, two or three) were rolled,
and the total on the dice was displayed, along with notification of
a win or a loss of a point (see Figure 1). Participants were then
asked to enter their evaluation of responsibility (“to what extent
is the player responsible for wining/losing of this point”) or of
causal strength (“to what extent did the player cause the win/loss
of this point”), by using a slider on a rating scale with endpoints
labeled from ‘0 = not at all responsible (not at all the cause)’ to
‘10 = completely responsible (completely the cause).’
FIGURE 1 | A screen-shot from the animation that participants watched in
Experiment 1. The agent (on the right) throws the dart toward the board. The
board is colored to illustrate the number of dice rolls earned. In this case, the
arrow landed on Ring 3 (counting from the outside in), earning two dice. Each
die landed on a 1, thus no point was won (a sum total for the dice of at least 6
was required to score a point).
Analysis
Our main focus is on the win data, and in particular, when
the total dice-score was equal to six, as this was the only
winning outcome in all dice conditions. We thus carried out
an ANOVA on the impact of the number of dice thrown (1,
2, or 3), of the ring number (odd vs. even), and of the type
of judgment (responsibility vs. causal strength). Note that the
odd/even categorical variable of ring number, contrasts between
ring values (1, 3, 5) vs. (2, 4, 6), and thus tested if ring value
matters once we control for the number of dice thrown. For
completeness, we also ran a linear mixed-effects model on all
success trials (where the total score is equal to or greater than
6), in which we predicted the causation and responsibility ratings
from three variables: number of dice thrown, ring number (odd
vs. even), and total score, as well as a participant dependent
intercept. Finally, we ran exactly the same analyses for the cases
of failures. Here, we replaced cases in which total dice score was 6
with those in which it was 5 in the ANOVA, and we also a linear
mixed-effects model all failure trials with number of dice thrown,
ring number and total score as predictors.
Results
We start with the causal strength and causal responsibility
judgments that are ascribed to the dart-throw agent for wins
(total score ≥ 6). To illustrate the results, we plot in Figure 2 the
mean ratings (for the total-score value of 6, which is the only win-
condition, that appears in combination with all ring-values) for
judgments of causal strength (left panel), and for responsibility
(right panel), as a function of number of dice and ring (odd/even).
To test the impact of number of dice and ring-parity, we
carried out a 3 × 2 × 2 ANOVA with number of dice rolled
(one/two/three) and the ring-parity (odd vs. even) as within-
subject factors, and judgment type (causation vs. responsibility)
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TABLE 1 | Profiles of the 20 clips used in Experiment 1.
Clip 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Ring 6 6 6 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1
N. dice 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Score 5 6 12 6 12 5 2 6 9 5 9 5 2 6 5 2 6 2 6 5
Result L W W W W L L W W L W L L W L L W L W L
Ring = ring that the dart landed in (1 = most outer ring, 6 = center ring), dice = number of dice rolled, score = what sum the dice added up to, result = loss (l) or win (w).























1 die 2 dice 3 dice




FIGURE 2 | Evaluations of causal strength (left) and of responsibility (right) as a function of the number of dice rolled and of the ring the dart hit: odd (blue) vs. even
(pink). Error bars indicate a within-subject ±1 standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).
as a between-subject factor. The results showed a significant
main effect for the number of dice rolled, F(2,200) = 55.21,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.356. Post hoc Bonferroni tests show that ratings
for hitting the inner rings (three dice) were significantly higher
than for the middle rings [two dice; t(100) = 7.57, p < 0.001,
d = 0.750], which were significantly higher than outer rings [one
dice; t(100) = 6.01, p < 0.001, d = 0.596]. No other main effects or
interactions were significant (see Supplementary A for a report
of the non-significant results).
This result was confirmed by a linear mixed effects model
with random intercepts for each participant on all success
outcomes trials, which showed that only the number of dice
thrown was a significant predictor of responsibility judgments
[b = 13.7, t(465) = 4.35, p < 0.001]. The regression coefficients
for the ring [b = 1.2, t(465) = 0.82, p = 0.414] and the
score [b = 0.5, t(465) = 1.41, p = 0.157] variables were not
significant (see Supplementary A for the model predictions).
We obtained similar results for the causation judgments. The
regression coefficient was only significant for the number of
dice [b = 13.8, t(447) = 4.287, p < 0.001]. The coefficients
of the ring [b = 0.5, t(447) = 0.31, p = 0.754] and the total
score [b = −0.2, t(447) = 0.60, p = 0.548] variables were
not significant.
Finally, the results for the cases of failure, reflect those for
the wins (see Supplementary A and Supplementary Figure S1).
We find that the only variable that affects either judgment is the
number of dice rolled – the variable that controls the success rate.
The more dice were rolled (as a result of a better dart-throw), the
lower was the ascription of causal responsibility to the agent for
an eventual failure, and the lower was the extent to which people
thought the agent caused the failure (see Supplementary A for
full report of statistical tests).
Discussion
As in previous studies (Gerstenberg et al., 2018), participants
judged agents whose actions yielded higher success rates to
be more responsible in case of success, but less responsible in
cases of failure. The exact same pattern is shown for judgments
of causal strength. Both the participants’ responsibility and
causation judgments support the robust-causation hypothesis
rather than the skill-only hypothesis. We reasoned that an agent’s
variation in skill would correspond to more localized dart throw
gradients (around the dart-board center, i.e., the 6-ring), and thus
would result in more throws ending in even (2, 4, 6) compared
with the odd (1, 3, 5) rings8. There was no such difference in
either the causal strength nor the causal responsibility judgments.
On the other hand, the robust causation hypothesis correctly
predicts that people’s judgments of causation and responsibility
are a function of the number of dice rolled, and not simply the
closeness of the dart to the center of the board. The total score
(which involves the luck of the dice throw) also did not affect the
judgments either (as long as it was at least 6), when holding the
8One may contend that a perfectly skilled and rational agent should be indifferent
to differences between rings that are equivalent in the number of dice deployed.
Such an agent, however, should always hit rings 5–6, and thus is inconsistent with
most cases shown in the experiment. A more plausible interpretation of skill is to
accept some unavoidable noise in the outcome and thus aim as close to the center
as possible.
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number of dice constant, indicating that judgments were affected
by the agent’s action, rather than by resultant luck (Nagel, 1979;
Gerstenberg et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, one might argue that there is a simpler
framework that can account for this pattern of results, which is
independent of the notion of robustness. The idea is that as we
increase the number of dice being rolled, we also increase the
success probability, and an increased probability of success may
lead to increased judgments of causal responsibility and causal
strength (Suppes, 1970; Cheng and Novick, 1992; Spellman,
1997). Note, however, that probability-raising and robustness are
not independent, and that one very typical way in which one
increases the success probability of an action is by making it
more robust. However, it is possible to tease apart robustness and
probability-raising empirically. In the following experiments, we
test the robustness hypothesis while keeping the probability of
success fixed across conditions. To do so, we will contrast two
types of actions whose success rate is the same, but which vary
in their robustness. In Experiment 2, we use an animated soccer
scenario, while in Experiments 3 and 4, we use a vignette based
on an analog of Ellsberg’s ambiguity paradox.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we hold probability-raising constant and
manipulate robustness in a more naturalistic setting – a soccer
set-up based on video animations. Since we obtained in the
previous experiment parallel results with the causal-strength and
the responsibility measures, and since our main interest is the
responsibility that agents have for the effects of their action, we
explicitly probed here the responsibility and praiseworthiness of
the agent. Participants view an animation with soccer players
taking free-kicks, and with three defenders that form a (slightly
moving) defensive wall in front of the goal (see demo link
in the Materials section). The soccer players vary on two
orthogonal factors – the probability of scoring a goal and the
execution strategy (both manipulations were carried out within
participants). In order to establish generality, we carried out two
versions of this experiment, in which we manipulated the success
probability by experience (Experiment 2a) and by description
(Experiments 2b and 2c)9. There were two strategies: (i) The
non-robust strategy of shooting directly into the wall (this may
result in a goal, if the defenders happen to accidentally move
out of the way). (ii) The robust strategy of shooting in a curved
trajectory around the wall (if successful, this strategy is robust
to the location of the defenders). Since a good execution based
on the second strategy might be perceived as more difficult
to achieve, we made it explicit that the probability of scoring
a goal (for the robust and non-robust players) were identical.
Participants evaluated the responsibility of four players (2 × 2
9Experience based manipulations are more similar to real life, but they could
be subject to biases in priors. The description-based manipulation explicitly
states the success probability rather than relying on participants’ inferences from
observation. Experiment 2c is a replication of Experiment 2b, which was carried
out during the review of the manuscript.
design) in scoring a specific goal in a free-kick for their team in
a decisive match.
As predicted by both robustness and the probability-raising
theory, we expected that participants would rate higher the
responsibility of the players who have a higher scoring record,
compared with players with a low scoring record whose goals may
be perceived as “lucky” (cf. Johnson and Rips, 2015; Gerstenberg
et al., 2018). As predicted by the robustness hypothesis, we
also expected that responsibility judgments would be higher for
players who bend their shots around the wall, even when the
success rate is equated. Players who successfully bend their shot
scored their goal in a way that is not dependent on the particular
background circumstances (and thus are less “lucky”).
Method
Participants
Twenty-two participants (4 female, 18 males; mean age = 28.67,
SD = 8.45) were tested in Experiment 2a – the experience-
condition. These participants were either Tel Aviv University
students (16 participants) that received 15 min credits for
participating in the lab, or volunteers (6 participants) who ran the
experiment on remote computers via a link to the same Qualtrics
site. Twenty participants (1 female, 19 males; mean age = 33.8,
SD = 12.8) were tested in Experiment 2b (description-condition
in which the success rate of each player was verbally stated).
These participants were recruited via “Hamidgam project” (the
Israeli equivalent of Amazon Mechanical Turk) and received a
payment that was equivalent to 0.41$ for participating. Three
additional participants were excluded because they reported
internet connectivity problems (2), or because they didn’t watch
or play soccer at least once a year (1). In Experiment 2c
(replication of Experiment 2b), we tested 46 participants (46
males, mean age = 29.09, SD = 4.47) via “i-Panel.”10 These
participants received a payment that was equivalent to 0.27$. All
participants across all three studies reported watching or playing
football at least once a year.
Materials and Procedure
Participants took part in the lab or remotely, using their
computer. After a short instruction, six sample free kicks for each
player (experience condition) or a table with the player’s success
rates and kick-style (description condition; see Supplementary
B) were shown. Video-clips were shown and ratings were made
using the Qualtrics platform. The video clips may be accessed
here: https://github.com/guygrinfeld/Responsibility-and-
Robust-Causation-Experiments/tree/master/videos-sample.
After watching each player (or reading information about each
player), a video-clip of a successful free-kick was shown (see
Figure 3) and subjects were asked to evaluate: “How responsible
and praiseworthy is the player for this goal?” on a scale from
0 (not responsible at all) to 100 (has full responsibility). Four
players were presented and rated sequentially, according to the
same procedure. Each player had a different color shirt to help
10We replicated Experiment 2b with a sample-size of 46 which was based on a
power analysis that resulted in 80% power for the robustness effect of Experiment
2b.
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FIGURE 3 | Illustration of the robust (curved, blue line) and non-robust
(straight to the wall, red line) free kicks. In the animation, the defenders are
moving, such that their locations are difficult to predict (see demo:
https://github.com/guygrinfeld/Responsibility-and-Robust-Causation-
Experiments/tree/master/videos-sample).
differentiate the players. The four players had the following
characteristics:
(1) Robust player (curved trajectory), low success rate: In
Experiment 2a, this player shoots the ball in a curved
trajectory and succeeds in two out of six free-kicks (i.e., 1/3
success rate). Successful free-kicks were second and fourth.
In the description condition, the success rate was stated as
30% in Experiment 2b and as 1/3 in Experiment 2c.
(2) Robust player (curved trajectory), high success rate: This
player scores in four out of six free-kicks (i.e., 2/3 success
rate). Successful free-kicks were first, third, fifth and sixth.
In Experiment 2b, the success rate was stated as 60% and in
Experiment 2c as 2/3.
(3) Non-robust player (straight trajectory), low success rate:
In Experiment 2a, this player shoots the ball straight at
the wall and succeeds in two out of six free-kicks (1/3
success rate). Successful free-kicks were second and fourth.
In Experiment 2b, the success rate was stated as 30% and in
Experiment 2c as 1/3.
(4) Non-robust player (straight trajectory), high success rate:
This player scores four out of six free-kicks (2/3 success rate).
Successful free-kicks were first, third, fifth, and sixth. The
success rate was stated as 60% in Experiment 2b and as 2/3
in Experiment 2c.
The order of four players was randomly assigned to
each participant.
Results
The responsibility judgments are shown in Figure 4. Three 2 × 2
ANOVAs with robustness (robust vs. non-robust) and success-
rate (1/3 vs. 2/3) as within-subject factors were carried out. In
Experiment 2a, we find main effects of robustness and of success
rate. The participants rated the players that took robust shots as
more responsible for the goal than those that took non-robust
shots, F(1,21) = 13.01, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.408. Participants also
rated players who had a high success rate more responsible for
their goals, compared to players who had a low success rate,
F(1,21) = 14.10, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.426. There was no significant
interaction between robustness and success rate, F(1,21) = 0.12,
p = 0.733, η 2p = 0.006.
In Experiment 2b (description), participants also rated the
robust players as more responsible for the goal than those
that took non-robust shots, yet this effect was only marginally
significant, F(1,19) = 3.06, p = 0.095, η2p = 0.127. As in Experiment
2a there was a main effect for success rate, F(1,19) = 6.38,
p = 0.020, η2p = 0.233, and no interaction between robustness
and success rate, F(1,19) = 0.26, p = 0.617, η2p = 0.012. Because
robustness was only marginally significant in the description
condition, we performed a replication study with a larger number
of participants (Experiment 2c; see Footnote 10). We replicated
our findings. Participants rated the robust players as more
responsible for the goal than those that took non-robust shots,
F(1,45) = 4.24, p = 0.045, η2p = 0.086. Participants also rated
the more successful players as more responsible, F(1,45) = 8.19,
p = 0.006, η2p = 0.154, with no interaction between these two
factors, F(1,45) = 1.42, p = 0.240, η 2p = 0.030.
Discussion
The results indicate that both success rate and robustness
(as operationalized by the action-outcome contingency being
dependent on background conditions), independently affect
causal responsibility ratings. Note that while the effect of
robustness appears larger in the experience condition11, it is also
present in the description condition. For the experience-based
condition, one may argue that the participants make inferences
on the success probabilities that are subject to bias in the priors,
resulting in larger success rates for the curved (thus impressive)
compared with the straight strategy kicks. Such biases could
generate a robustness effect due to a success-rate artifact. Such a
memory bias effect, however, is less plausible in the description
condition, in which the success rates are explicitly stated (see
Experiment 4 for an explicit test showing that the participants
showed accurate memory of stated success rates).
The results indicate that the robustness of an action (the
way the player takes the free-kick) affects the attribution of
responsibility for its outcome (the goal), independent of the
success rate. The results also consistent with the probability-
raising principle, and indeed robust actions are typically more
likely to succeed (but see Experiments 3–4 and Vasilyeva et al.,
2018, for situations in which this is not the case). Both of these
results could be understood to result from the negative influence
of luck on the degree of responsibility, and from the idea that
goals by players who shoot through the wall are more likely to
have resulted from luck (cf. Gerstenberg et al., 2018).
There is, however, an alternative interpretation for the
robustness effect. Accordingly, one may argue that the robust
and successful kicks involve more skill, and therefore, it is a skill
and not robustness per se that affected participants’ judgments.
While the skill hypothesis was not supported in Experiment 1,
Experiment 3 will control both probability-raising and skill.
EXPERIMENT 3
In this experiment, we further test for robustness using a design
that controls both probability-raising and skill. Our experimental
11It is possible that the larger effects in Experiment 2a are due to most participants
being tested under more controlled lab conditions rather than online.
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FIGURE 4 | Judgments of causal responsibility, as a function of success rate and robustness, in Experiment 2, for the Experience (left panel, n = 22) and for the
Description (middle panel, n = 20; and right panel, n = 46) conditions. Error bars indicate within-subject ±1 standard error of the mean.
TABLE 2 | An adaptation of the Ellsberg paradox.
Red balls Black balls Yellow balls
Urn 1 30 10 50
Urn 2 30 50 10
The values indicate the number of differently colored balls in two different urns.
set-up is inspired by the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961; see
also Vasilyeva et al., 2018). Consider an agent that is faced with
a lottery in which a ball is randomly selected from one of two
urns (Table 2). In Urn 1 there are 30 red, 10 black, and 50 yellow
balls while in Urn 2 there are 30 red, 50 black, and 10 yellow balls.
The agent has no control over which urn is chosen; the urn is
selected by another person. The agent also does not know the
probability with which this person chooses Urn 1 versus Urn 2
and can bet either on red or on black. Which color should she bet
on? The typical Ellsberg paradox result, is that when faced with
such choices, agents prefer to bet on red (which has a definite 1/3
probability of a win) than on black (whose win probability is not
determined and can be anything between 1/9 and 5/9). Here, we
don’t focus on preferences, but rather on how observers judge
the causal responsibility of agents who achieve a goal by taking a
robust or a non-robust action.
Note, that for this situation, the outcome of the action (bet-red
or bet-black) depends probabilistically on both the ball selected
and on the background condition (the other person selecting
Urn 1 or Urn 2). The bet-red action is thus more robust than
bet-black, because its win probability is stable across background
conditions (Urn 1 vs. Urn 2). By betting on red, one’s probability
of success is rendered independent of the urn selection, whereas
betting on black entails that one’s probability of success depends
on the urn chosen by the other person.
According to the robustness hypothesis, we predicted that
participants would judge that an agent who wins as a result of
a robust bet is more responsible than one who wins as a result
of an unstable bet. Note that here there is no difference in the
skill that the execution of the strategy requires. In addition,
we also manipulated whether the background condition (Urn 1
vs. Urn 2) was decided by another person or by a computer.
We hypothesized that if the background circumstance involves
another agent who acts intentionally, the robustness effect
will be enhanced, compared with a background circumstance
that involves a non-intentional mechanism (Lombrozo, 2010).
One possibility, for example, is that the presence of an
agent (as a background condition) makes this background
condition more salient.
To make the setting more realistic for our student participants,
we framed the task in an exam setting. In particular, participants
were asked to rate a candidate’s responsibility for exam successes,
with relation to his/her preparation for this exam. Participants
read about six candidates, each of whom prepared differently in
the way they allocated study time to the potential exam-topics
(studied both topics or only one of them) and with regards
to the total time they studied (duration of 3 or 5 days). The
exam topic was picked randomly by the computer or by another
agent. In this experiment, we were interested in responsibility
for success in the exam. However, we added two additional
filler candidates who failed the exam, in order to make the




Twenty Tel Aviv university students (17 females, 3 males; mean
age = 22.9, SD = 2.0) took part in return for 15 min credit points
needed in their BA requirements. Subjects spoke Hebrew as their
mother tongue (17), or had at least advanced Hebrew reading
capabilities (3).
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Materials and Procedure
The experiment was run in lab, and presented via Qualtrics.
First, participants read the following short text that introduced
a hypothetical hiring procedure (exam topics and success rates
were bolded and colored to ease the tracking of details; see
Supplementary C):
“Assume that Google is recruiting new employees who need
to pass a knowledge and ability exam. The exam questions this
year may involve one of two possible topics: Algorithms or
Cryptography (Google informs the candidates about the possible
topics 1 week before the exam). Assume also that a candidate who
is good at programming and did a BA in Computer Science has a
30% chance to pass the exam without any special preparation, no
matter what topic is tested. However, if the candidate studies for
the exam, her/his chance to pass it will increase as follows:
• A candidate who studies for 3 days on both topics (sharing
time between them), will pass the exam with 50% chance if
s/he gets a question about Algorithms, and also a 50% chance
to pass if asked about Cryptography.
• A candidate who studies for 3 days but chooses to learn only
one topic, will pass with 70% chance if tested on this topic, but
remains at 30% if asked about the other topic.
• A candidate who studies for 5 days on both topics, will
pass the exam with 60% chance if s/he gets a question
about Algorithms, and also a 60% chance to pass if asked
about Cryptography.
• A candidate who studies for 5 days but chooses to learn only
for one topic, will pass with 90% chance if tested on this topic,
but remain at a 30% chance if asked about the other topic.
Next, participants were presented with information about a
number of candidates for the latest Google-exam (see Table 3),
all having “very similar intellectual abilities and programming
skills, as reflected by their BA record, but differing in the way they
prepared for the exam, and on the circumstances that determined
the exam topic.” The participants were asked to evaluate the
responsibility of each candidate for passing or failing the exam on
a 1–100 slider scale bar (see Supplementary C). The candidates
(and their evaluations) were presented sequentially (not in table
format), and participants were told that they can take as long as
they need and that they are allowed to look back and compare
previous judgments.
Participants were told that “in the morning of the exam,
the exam-topic of Cryptography was randomly chosen by the
computer software.” After answering all of the eight evaluations,
the participants were asked to make the same (A–H) evaluations
again with one difference, which involved the manner in which
the exam-topic was selected. Instead of having the topic randomly
selected by the computer-software, participants were told that “in
the morning of the exam, the topic of Algorithms was randomly
chosen by computer software, but the head of recruitment
decided not to let the computer determine the exam-topic and
switched it to Cryptography.”
The reason for the second set of evaluations was twofold. First,
we wanted to test if the effects (of success rate and of robustness)
are stable. Second, we wanted to test if the robustness effect is
TABLE 3 | The candidates presented for judgment in Experiment 3.
Candidate Robust
A studied for 3 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and passes the exam.
+
B studied for 5 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and passes the exam.
+
C studied for 3 days only on Cryptography and
passes the exam.
−
D studied for 5 days only on Cryptography and
passes the exam
−
E studied for 3 days only on Algorithms and
passes the exam.
−
F studied for 5 days only on Algorithms and
passes the exam.
−
G studied for 3 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and fails the exam.
+
H studied for 5 days only on Cryptography and
fails the exam.
−
modulated by the presence of another agent, who is involved
in the setting of the background conditions that, together
with the candidate’s action, determine the action’s success (a
type of responsibility dilution). For each exam candidate, the
participants were asked to rate “to what extent is the candidate
responsible for his success/failure in the exam?” (A screenshot of
the materials is presented in the Supplementary C).
Analysis
We focus on a number of contrasts, based on the candidates
who passed the exam. We focus on the candidates that succeed
in their exam, because our theory of robust causation depends
on the agent taking an action that is intended to bring about
an event (Woodward, 2006; Usher, 2018). Thus, robustness
manipulations should be tested on events that match the agent’s
intention (success cases) and not on events that do not match
(failures); but see further discussion for the case of failure
in Experiment 4.
First contrasting robust candidates (A and B) with non-
robust candidates (C and D; see Table 3) provides an estimate
of the robustness effect. Second, contrasting candidates A and
C, who studied for 3 days, with candidates, B and D, who
studied for 5 days, provides an estimate for the effect study-
duration (3 vs. 5 days). Third, comparing candidates C and D,
who passed by studying only the selected topic, with candidates
E and F, who passed by studying the topic that was not
selected, provides an estimate of the effect that the match
between the topic studied and the one selected makes for
non-robust type actions (this match affects the success rate,
conditioned on the background condition that was active).
For example, if one studies the topic that was probed, the
success rate should be inferred to be higher, and we predict
that this will affect the responsibility ratings for success in the
two cases. Fourth, the difference between the robustness effect
in the computer-condition and in the “head of recruitment”
condition reveals whether the robustness effect is modulated by
the presence of an agent.
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FIGURE 5 | Ratings of responsibility (cases A–D, in Table 3) in Experiment 3. Both the study-duration and the robust/stable action received higher ratings. Error bars
indicate within-subject ±1 standard error of the mean.
Results and Discussion
Planned comparisons provided significant differences for all the
variables above. Specifically, there was a significant robustness
effect, where responsibility ratings of robust candidates A and
B (M = 69.82, SD = 17.21) were higher than of non-robust
candidates C and D [M = 52.80, SD = 19.00; F(1,19) = 12.69,
p = 0.002, η2p = 0.400], and a significant study-duration effect,
where responsibility ratings of the three-learning-days candidates
A and C (M = 55.28, SD = 15.70) were lower than of five-learning-
days candidates B and D [M = 67.34, SD = 14.27; F(1,19) = 69.29,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.785; see Figure 5]. This is consistent
with the 2 × 2 × 2 within subjects ANOVA (on the A–D
items), which resulted in three main effects (robustness, success-
rate, and agent-framing) but no significant interactions. The
“head of recruitment” framing reduced responsibility judgments,
F(1,19) = 5.61, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.228. However, while this effect
was numerically larger for the non-robust (C and D) than for
the robust (A and B) candidates, this difference did not reach
statistical significance, F(1,19) = 0.79, p = 0.384, η 2p = 0.040.
Finally, we examine the effect that the difference in match
(between the topic studied and the one selected) makes for
non-robust type actions (C and D vs. E and F). Planned
comparisons revealed that participants rated the match cases
higher (studied Cryptography and exam-topic was Cryptography)
than non-match cases [studied Algorithms and exam-topic was
Cryptography F(1,19) = 11.37, p = 0.003, η 2p = 0.374].
The results of this experiment confirmed most of our
predictions. First, as predicted by both robustness and probability
raising, participants gave higher responsibility ratings for exam
success to candidates who had a higher chance of success as a
result of studying more. However, as predicted by robustness
alone, participants rated robust candidates higher, who studied
both topics, and thus their success was less dependent on
background conditions.
Nevertheless, it is possible to query the type of judgments that
the participants made. While we formulated this in terms of the
“to what extent is the agent responsible for success/failure in the
exam,” one may also wonder whether participants distinguish
between this and mere causal strength evaluation. Indeed, many
experiments (including our Experiment 1) obtain similar results
with causal strength and causal responsibility judgments. Our
final experiment aims to contrast between these two measures
and also to extend the judgments from cases of success to both
success and failure.
EXPERIMENT 4
In Experiment 4, we aimed to replicate the results of Experiment
3 (validating memory of the success rates) and to contrast
judgments of responsibility and judgments of causal strength.
Although often, these two types of judgments have parallel effects,
we expect these judgments to come apart in this specific setup.
Compare, for example, candidates A and C (see Table 3), both
of whom succeeded in the exam after having studied the same
amount, but with A having divided the study among the two
topics, while C having studied, only the topic that was tested.
Following Chockler and Halpern (2004), we proposed that when
judging the extent to which each candidate is responsible for
the exam’s success/failure, participants will take the epistemic
perspective of the candidates at the time they made the action.
On the other hand, when asked to evaluate the causal strength by
which the action caused the effect, we expect participants to take
an objective perspective, which includes the actual background
circumstances. Indeed, in the actual situation in which the exam
topic was chosen for which the non-robust candidate studied, the
non-robust candidate has a greater success contingency than the
robust-candidate.
In addition, we wanted to extend the range of cases to include
cases of failure. For the case of responsibility, we do not make a
specific prediction on how robustness (as expressed by studying
a single or two topics) will affect the responsibility of failure
(This is because failures do not satisfy the intentional-match
requirement in robust action, and the robust action is more
stable in its prediction of both success/failure). However, we
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expect a dissociation between the effects of study-duration on
causal strength and responsibility judgments. Consider the case
of an agent studying for only one topic, which does not come
up in the exam, resulting in exam failure. While judgments
of causal strength should be invariant to how long the agent
studied (as the amount of studying the wrong topic should not
affect the contingency with exam success/failure), judgments
of causal responsibility are expected to decrease with study
duration. Indeed, if judging responsibility depends on adopting
the epistemic perspective of the agent, the actual background
circumstances (topic mismatch) should not be assumed, and
therefore, the more an agent studies for the exam, the more
responsible she is for success (and less for failures), independent
on whether the topic matches or not.
The experiment was identical to Experiment 3, except for a
few modifications. First, we removed the head of recruitment vs.
computer condition (we kept the computer framing only), and
we included four candidates (A–D) that succeeded in the exam,
and four candidates who failed (two who studied both topics, and
two who studied the wrong topic). Second, we manipulated the
type of rating (causal responsibility vs. causal strength) between
participants in order to prevent a carryover between the two types
of judgments. This allowed us to test the predicted dissociation
between causal strength and responsibility judgments in cases of
success, based on adopting the agent’s epistemic perspective in
the latter. Finally, we also included a post-test memory check,
in which we asked participants about the success rates of the
various candidates, in order to ensure that participants based
their judgments on the data we provided.
Method
Participants
Sixty students at Tel Aviv University (30 in each condition12; 23
females, 37 males; mean age = 22.5, SD = 1.6) participated in this
study in return for 15 min credit points.
Materials
The framing of the story was identical to Experiment 3. The eight
candidates presented for evaluation are shown in Table 4.
Procedure
Responsibility judgments were assessed in the same way as in
Experiment 3. In the causal strength condition, participants were
asked: “To what extent did the study of the candidate cause the
outcome in the exam?” As a memory check, after judging the
candidates, participants were asked to fill in a table with success
rates of the various candidates.
Analysis
Based on the predictions we outlined, we carried out 2 × 2
ANOVAs for passing candidates with factors of robustness and
study-duration, separately for each judgment type (responsibility
vs. causation). While cases of failure do not satisfy the intentional
match criterion above, we also report the responsibility for these
12Based on the effect size in Experiment 3, this sample should allow a 95% power
for replication of the robustness effect.
TABLE 4 | The job-candidates presented for judgment in Experiment 4.
Candidate Robust
A studied for 3 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and passes the exam.
+
B studied for 5 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and passes the exam.
+
C studied for 3 days only on Cryptography and
passes the exam.
−
D studied for 5 days only on Cryptography and
passes the exam
−
E studied for 3 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and fails the exam.
+
F studied for 5 days on both Algorithms and
Cryptography and fails the exam.
+
G studied for 3 days only on Algorithms and
fails the exam.
−
H studied for 5 days only on Algorithms and
fails the exam.
−
judgments, and we carry out a similar 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA for the
cases of failure.
Results and Discussion
The post-experimental memory test showed that the participants
remembered well the success rates of the eight candidates that
they were required to rate, as indicated by the post-experimental
memory test (see Supplementary Figure S2 and Supplementary
C). We now turn to the ratings of causal responsibility and of
causal strength.
Causal Responsibility
For successful candidates (A–D in Table 4), we replicated the
results of Experiment 3. There were two main effects, for
robustness [F(1,29) = 8.50, p = 0.007, η2p = 0.227] and for study-
duration [F(1,29) = 34.62, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.544], respectively.
As shown in the upper-left panel of Figure 6, participants
gave higher ratings to the robust study candidates and also to
candidates who studied longer. There was also an interaction
between these two factors [F(1,29) = 5.46, p = 0.027, η2p = 0.158].
However, the simple effects of robustness were significant at both
study-duration conditions [for 3 days, F(1,29) = 7.09, p = 0.012;
for 5 days F(1,29) = 8.94, p = 0.006].
For the failed candidates (E–H in Table 4; upper-right
panel in Figure 6), we obtained a main effect of robustness.
Participants rated the candidates who studied in a robust way
(both topics) as less responsible for their failure (M = 46.89,
SD = 25.97) than the ones who studied in a non-robust way
[on the topic that was not chosen, M = 67.23, SD = 23.52;
F(1,29) = 18.70, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.392]. We also found a
main effect of study-duration [F(1,29) = 14.36, p = 0.001,
η2p = 0.331] and an interaction between robustness and study-
duration [F(1,29) = 17.00, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.370]. The duration
of study reduced the responsibility for failing in the exam only
for the candidates that studied both topics [F(1,29) = 22.13,
p < 0.001, η 2p = 0.433].
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FIGURE 6 | Responsibility ratings (upper panels) and causal strength ratings (lower panels) for passed (left) and failed (right) candidates in Experiment 4. Error bars
indicate within-subject ±1 standard error of the mean.
Causal Strength
For successful candidates, judgments of causal strength showed
main effects of robustness and study-duration. As in the
responsibility condition, the duration of study increased the
ratings [F(1,29) = 153.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.841; lower-right
panel]. However, oppositely to the responsibility condition,
here robustness strongly decreased causal strength ratings
[F(1,29) = 11.55, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.285]. Indeed, participants
judged that a candidate who spent her time studying only
the topic that was selected, caused the success in the exam
to a higher degree (M = 76.36, SD = 21.05) than one
who spent the same amount of time studying both topics
(M = 63.61, SD = 19.94). Thus, judgments of causal-strength,
but not of causal responsibility, appear to track the extent
to which the action increased the probability of the outcome
(conditional on the actual background conditions).13 There
was no interaction between study-duration and robustness
[F(1,29) = 1.62, p = 0.213, η 2p = 0.053].
Finally, for failed candidates there was a main effect of
robustness. Participants saw non-robust candidates who studied
the wrong topic to have caused their failure to a higher
13See Endnote 4 in Vasilyeva et al. (2018), for results showing that judgments of
causal strength track the extent to which the action increased the probability of the
outcome (conditional on the actual background condition).
degree (M = 67.20, SD = 29.44) than robust candidates who
studied both topics [M = 36.58, SD = 19.39; F(1,29) = 24.74,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.460]. Also, like for casual responsibility,
the amount of study reduced casual strength [F(1,29) = 4.75,
p = 0.037, η2p = 0.141]. This reduction seems to be stronger
in candidates who studied both topics, but this interaction
(between robustness and study-duration) was not significant
[F(1,29) = 2.50, p = 0.125, η 2p = 0.079].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In four experiments, we tested if the extent to which agents are
held causally responsible for the outcomes of their actions is
affected by the robustness with which the action brought about
the outcome (Woodward, 2006; Icard et al., 2017; Vasilyeva et al.,
2018). In the first experiment, we manipulated robustness by
explicitly increasing the number of background circumstances
(possible dice outcomes) in which the action (dart throw) results
in a win. We did this by contrasting actions (dart throws)
that result in one, two or three dice rolls, depending on the
ring number of the dart on the board (where success requires
a sum of 6 on the dice). We found that agents whose dart
throws result in more dice are seen as more responsible for
success (and less responsible for failures). We observed the same
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pattern of results for judgments of causal strength. The parallel
effects of robustness on judgments of causal strength and causal
responsibility are consistent with the responsibility-view, which
sees causal attributions as mediated by normative attributions
about what an agent should have done in a given situation
(Sytsma et al., 2012). To achieve more dice rolls, one needs more
skill. However, by comparing even vs. odd ring-numbers, we
found that participants’ judgments of causal responsibility and
causal strength tracked robustness and were not merely affected
by the skill of the player. These results are also consistent with
probability-raising accounts according to which responsibility
and causal strength judgments track the extent to which an action
increased the probability of the observed outcome (Suppes, 1970;
Cheng and Novick, 1992; Spellman, 1997; see also Kominsky
et al., 2015; Icard et al., 2017, for recent studies showing that
judgments of causal strength vary with the typicality of the cause
and the background conditions).
Experiments 2–4 tested for effects of robustness while
controlling for probability raising. Experiment 2 examined a
soccer scenario in which strikers had two different ways of taking
free-kicks. The non-robust action is to shoot the ball directly
through the defensive wall. Such an action may result in a goal,
depending on background circumstances that the agent does not
control (the position and movement of the defending players).
The robust action is to bend the ball around the wall; if well-
executed, this action results in a goal in a way that depends less on
background conditions (the exact location of the defenders do not
matter). Because taking a well-executed curved kick is difficult,
players may have similar success rates when employing the
two strategies. We thus presented participants with animations
of such hypothetical players, and independently manipulated
success probability and robustness. To ensure that participants
are not biased in their success probability assessment by the
type of kick (due to prior expectations), we included a condition
that stated the success probability, rather than leaving it for
participants to estimate. For both description and experience
conditions, we found that ratings of responsibility increased
with robustness, even when the probability of success was kept
constant. While these results support the robustness hypothesis,
they are subject to an alternative explanation. In particular,
it is possible that the ratings don’t reflect considerations of
robustness, but rather the inferred skill of the agent (cf.
Gerstenberg et al., 2018). Experiments 3–4 addressed this issue
using a scenario based on an Ellsberg-type design and using
an exam-success setting (see also Vasilyeva et al., 2018, for a
similar design).
In Experiment 3, the action (the way to prepare for the exam)
did not vary in skill between the robust (split study time between
both topics) and non-robust (study only one topic) action. Also,
the overall success rate of the robust action was equated with that
of the non-robust one, but the outcome of the non-robust action
was more variable, depending on an external factor (selected
exam topic). Hence, an account based on probability raising
would not predict any differences in judgments. Note, moreover,
that after a particular exam topic was selected the probability
of success is now in favor of the non-robust case if the topic
selected matches the one that the candidate prepared for. Like
in Experiment 2, the results showed effects of both success
rate and robustness. In particular, participants judged candidates
who prepared for both topics more responsible for their exam
success than those who only prepared for a single one, and were
lucky in that this topic was chosen. Note also that judgments of
responsibility tracked robustness even though, as stated above,
the non-robust candidates actually had a higher probability of
success given the lucky background.
Finally, in Experiment 4, we replicated the results of
Experiment 3 under two important modifications. First, in
addition to assessing causal responsibility, we also assessed
judgments of causal strength. We predicted that the role
of robustness would be different in judgments of causal
responsibility versus causal strength, because the agent’s
epistemic perspective is more important for judgments
of causal responsibility (in this case, we predicted that
participants would adopt the agent’s epistemic perspective).
The results fully replicated the results of Experiment 3 in the
responsibility/success case. Second, we examined how study-
duration and study-type affect the responsibility and the causal
strength judgments in cases of failures. Consistent with previous
findings (Gerstenberg et al., 2018), participants judged agents
who took robust actions that yielded more stable success rate,
to be more responsible in case of success, but less responsible
in cases of failure. Note that while this result is easy to motivate
for study-duration (because it is positively correlated with
success-rate and negatively correlated with failure-rate), it is
less straightforward for study-type. Here the robust action, of
studying both topics, is more stable with regards to both the
success/failure events. In other words, while a robust action
that resulted in success is more stable to changes in background
conditions, so is a robust action that resulted in failure. These
results are consistent with the idea that the effect of robustness
(studying one vs. both topics in Experiments 3–4) is evaluated
based on the stability of the contingency between the action and
the successful outcome (the action’s goal). We propose that for
cases of failure, the robustness is derived from a negation of the
goal-achievement: because the agent is more responsible (when
doing A compared with B) if she succeeded in achieving her
goal, she is less responsible (when doing A compared with B),
in case the goal was not achieved. Finally, we find that for cases
of failure, neither causal responsibility nor causal strength are
affected by the study duration, for candidates who study only the
wrong topic. This shows that study duration alone affects causal
judgments only when it plays a role in the causal chain of events
from action to outcome.
While we attribute the robustness boost of the responsibility
judgments in Experiments 2–4 to the lack of causal dependency
on background conditions (external to the agent), such as other
players (Experiment 2) or the exam selection (Experiments 3–
4), it is still possible to suggest that some of the participants
are nevertheless responsive to some inferred agential trait, such
as skill (Experiment 2), or study efficiency (Experiments 3–4).
We ruled out skill as a mediator, in our analysis of Experiment
1, and our instructions attempted to eliminate it as a factor in
Experiments 2–4. For example, we explained that the success rate
of robust/non-robust players is the same (Experiment 2), and
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that all candidates are equal in their computer science knowledge
and abilities (Experiment 3–4). Nevertheless, it is still possible
that some participants may have inferred that a robust candidate
(who studied both topics and succeeded) is more effective than a
non-robust one (who studied the one topic that happened to be
assessed in the exam). Accordingly, as suggested by Gerstenberg
et al. (2018) an inferred agent trait (skill) could potentially
mediate the effect that robustness has on judgments of causal
responsibility. While future studies will be needed to test the
possibility of further dissociating robustness from skill, we believe
that this should not be viewed as a confound. Rather skill is
probably a necessary feature of agents who exercise robust control
(Usher, 2018).
The most novel result of this experiment, however, was
the difference between the patterns observed in the causal
responsibility and the causal strength condition (see Figure 6,
left panels). While the causal responsibility of the agent increased
with robustness (as the participants took the agent epistemic
perspective), the causal-strength decreased with robustness, as
the participants took a more objective perspective, assuming
knowledge of the actual background circumstance. We believe
that this dissociation (and deviation from the responsibility view;
Sytsma et al., 2012), which is a rare one in the literature, was made
possible by the specific Ellsberg-type design, which allowed us to
dissociate between the objective contingency and the agent-based
epistemic one. While future studies will be needed to test the
possibility of further dissociating robustness from inferred skill
in this type of design, we believe that in ecological conditions
(e.g., Experiment 2) skill and robustness are associated, as skill
is typically a feature agents need to deploy in order to exercise
robust control (Usher, 2018). In the following, we discuss the
implications of our results for normativity and their relation with
other related studies.
Normativity
The results of Experiment 1 are readily understood from a
normative perspective: rational agents should aspire to increase
the likelihood of their desired outcomes. As discussed by
Woodward (2006) robust actions (shooting a person in the
heart) are more likely to achieve a goal (like the death of the
victim), compared to non-robust actions (shooting the victim
in the leg, which may or may not result in death), as the
outcomes of such non-robust actions are likely to depend on
background circumstances. Similarly, Woodward (2006) has
argued that robustness is a critical difference that distinguishes
between cases of causation by action and causation by omission
or by double prevention (see Lombrozo, 2010 and Cushman and
Young, 2011, for experimental studies showing that participants
are sensitive to these differences in their causal judgments).
Furthermore, Lombrozo (2010) has argued that moral judgments
are affected by the stability of the causal relation to variations
in background circumstances. More recently, Usher (2018) has
argued that in order to achieve robust causation of actions
over desired outcomes, agents deploy a teleological guidance
control that is based on a means-ends strategies (cf. Heider,
1958). As agents do not have access to all information on
background circumstances, they should attempt to act so as to
make the outcome less dependent on such circumstances. In our
Experiment 1, achieving a 3 dice roll, grants the agent with more
opportunities to succeed, making her less dependent on chance.
A similar situation obtains in Experiment 2, by attempting a
curved-style free-kick, the agent takes an action whose outcome
is less dependent on circumstances beyond her control.
In Experiments 2–4, we clarified to our participants that the
probability of success of the robust and non-robust action is the
same. In Experiment 2, robustness to background circumstances
was balanced by the difficulty of executing such an action. In
Experiments 3–4, were inspired by Ellsberg scenario (Ellsberg,
1961) that let us keep the probability of success fixed but to vary
the robustness. Still, we find that people evaluate the agent as
more responsible for the outcome of her action, in the case of
robust action. The normativity of this judgment, thus, requires a
special discussion.
Our conceptualization of robustness, via a count of
background circumstances that enable an intended event
was proposed by Woodward based on a number of conceptual
considerations, such as invariance (Woodward, 2003, 2006). This
conceptualization also has the advantage that it does not require
access to probabilities of the background circumstances (which
are often difficult to access). Usually, robustness as measured by
this count definition, correlates with the success probability as in
our Experiment 1, however, robustness and probability raising
can also stand in opposition. For example, one may contrast an
action that produces an effect in 10 background conditions with
a small probability (say, 5% in each) with another that produces
the effect in a single background condition (but with a higher
probability, of say, 90%). It is beyond our aim to make either
normative or empirical claims about what is expected in such
special situations. Our Experiments 2–4, kept the total success
probability fixed while varying the count-type robustness.
Thus, we believe they support the more modest conclusion,
that once the success probability is fixed, the count-measure of
robustness affects the judgments of causal responsibility. Future
investigations will be required to examine tradeoffs between
success probability and count-measures of robustness.
What our Experiments 3–4 show is that the preference for the
stable alternatives (those whose success rate does not depend on
factors that are not known, also labeled as ambiguity-aversion;
Ellsberg, 1961), is also reflected when we judge agents who
take robust actions (in the sense above) as higher in causal
responsibility. We believe that the reason for this is the fact
that the success of the non-robust action appears lucky (see also
Gerstenberg et al., 2018), as it depends more on other agents or
circumstances. In Gerstenberg et al. (2018), the contrast between
agent-bearing responsibility actions (for which the agent gets
high credit) and lucky ones (for which she gets less credit)
was made via the contingency between the action and the
outcome. Here, we kept this contingency constant (or even
reduced it in the case of robust actions compared to non-robust
matched actions, Experiments 3–4), but we manipulated the
presence of non-agent background conditions. Thus, consistent
with Woodward’s theory of robust causation (2006), lucky actions
are those in which the background conditions contributed
significantly to the outcome, and thus, non-robust actions receive
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lower responsibility, reflecting a type of diffusion of responsibility
among multiple causes (Lagnado et al., 2013). Indeed, in previous
studies, Lagnado et al. (2013) showed that when the number of
agents that disjunctively contributed to an event increases, the
judged responsibility of each agent is reduced. Since our non-
robust actions allow other agents (or factors) to contribute to
the production of the intended event (note that this may involve
a contribution by non-acting, as for the defenders who miss
blocking the ball shot through the wall), we can think of their
effect on judgments of responsibility as a type of responsibility
diffusion. The robust actions, on the other hand, are such that
they screen-off the intended event from the impact of other
agents or background circumstances and thus, they satisfy a
robust sufficiency criterion.
Finally, another advantage of robustness is that robust causal
setups have the advantage that the causal Markov condition14
is preserved on the level of overall categories. In contrast, in
setups with subcategories with the same causal structure but
different causal strength, the Markov condition does not hold
globally, resulting in distorted judgments of correlations and
causal relationships (von Sydow et al., 2016; Hebbelmann and
von Sydow, 2017; cf. Hagmayer et al., 2011).
Relation to Other Work and Alternative
Theories
In a recent paper, Vasilyeva et al. (2018) reported that people’s
judgments about causal generalizations and causal explanations
are sensitive to the stability of these relations, even when
probability-raising is controlled. In their studies, participants
were presented with descriptions or contingency tables for a
potential causal relation, and were then asked to indicate the
degree to which they endorse a causal explanation (or causal
generalization) for the situation described. For example, in
studies 1 and 2, participants were presented with contingency
tables for fictional lizard-like species (Zelmos), which either
did or did not eat yona-plants (the action) and either did or
did not get sore antennas (the effect). These tables included a
moderating variable (drinking salty/fresh water) that varied or
did not vary the relationship between the action and the effect.
The presence of the moderating variable that affected the action-
effect relationship reduced the degree of causal endorsement,
even though the average causal strength across the moderating
variable was the same. In their study 3, a similar result was
obtained for the endorsement of a causal relation between people
taking a vitamin and the effects on bone density, with gene-type
as a moderating variable.
While these findings parallel our results from Experiment
3, there are a number of important differences, and thus we
believe that the two approaches complement each other. The
central difference is that while our experiment was designed to
assess people’s judgments of the extent to which an agent’s action
14The causal Markov condition is a critical assumption of the Causal Bayesian
framework (Pearl, 2000; Woodward, 2003)– whereby any variable in a causal
model is conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its direct causes.
While there is controversy about whether people uphold this condition in their
intuitive inferences (see Sloman and Lagnado, 2015, for summary), it is a desirable
property for normative inference.
was causally responsible for bringing about an outcome they
intended, Vasilyeva et al. (2018) assessed people’s endorsement
of causal relations and of causal explanations between (type
or token) events.
For example, in one of their experimental conditions, which is
most similar to ours, after being presented with the background
and the contingency tables, participants were told: “Your
assistants select one of the zelmos with sore antennas from
your second experiment. They call him Timmy. During the
experiment, Timmy has eaten yonas. You do not know whether
Timmy drank fresh water or salty water during the experiment.
How much do you agree with the following statement about
what caused Timmy’s sore antennas? Eating yonas caused Timmy’s
antennas to become sore” (Vasilyeva et al., 2018, Table 2, p. 8).
Compare this with our scenario in Experiments 3 and 4,
where participants evaluated the causal responsibility that the
agent’s action (type of study) has for the outcome (success/failure
in exam), under conditions that differ in sensitivity to an
external circumstance (question chosen by the computer or by
another agent). There are two important differences. First, as we
formulate this at the level of agents taking an action toward a
goal, we can probe the causal responsibility of the agent for the
outcome of the action and contrast it with the causal-strength
(it would make little sense to ask “how responsible is the Zelmo
for getting sore antennas” in this context); agent-responsibility
requires a set of minimum epistemic conditions, such as the agent
foreseeing the potential consequences of her actions (or being in
a state where she is expected to do so), which are in place in our
case. While one may ask instead about the causal responsibility
between the events (‘eating yonas’ and ‘having sore antennas’),
we point below to an important difference.
Second, there is an important epistemic difference. In the
‘zelmos sore-antenna’ case the reduced causal endorsement of
the causal relation in the non-stable condition is conditioned
on lack of knowledge: participants did not know about the state
of the moderating variable (“You do not know whether Timmy
drank fresh water or salty water during the experiment”). In
our Experiment 3–4, on the other hand, participants knew the
state of the background variable (the exam topic selected). In
contrast to Vasilyeva et al. (2018), we obtained an increased
degree of causal strength (in the non-robust condition), showing
that when such information becomes available, the participants
rely on it in their causal strength judgments, and they do
not adopt the agent’s epistemic perspective [see Endnote 4,
in Vasilyeva et al. (2018), for a similar result]. Both of these
results are normatively reasonable, as it makes sense to attribute
increased causal strength to a causal relation that has a stronger
contingency (our Experiment 4, and results reported in Vasilyeva
et al., 2018, Endnote 4), and also to feel uncertain of the causal
relation (Vasilyeva et al., 2018) given lack of knowledge on
whether the sample belongs to a case that does or does not involve
causal relation.
More importantly, we find that, even in a condition in which
the causal contingency favors the non-robust action, causal
responsibility judgments show a robustness effect: higher ratings
for the robust actions. This provides a strong demonstration
that robust actions confer more responsibility on an agent, even
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if the actual state of the environment happens to be such that
the actual probability of success is lower. We have argued that
the difference between opposed effects of robustness on causal
responsibility and causal strength (Figure 6), stem from the
fact than in responsibility attributions, participants consider the
epistemic state of the agent. We believe that, taken together, our
studies and those of Vasilyeva et al. (2018), provide compelling
and complementary evidence for the importance of robustness in
the endorsement of causal responsibility relations between events
and of causal explanation, and in judging the causal responsibility
an agent has for the outcome of her action.
Further Implications and Future
Research
We have focused here on judgments of causal responsibility.
Future research is needed to clarify the normative aspect of
stability in responsibility judgments, as well as its derivation
from theoretical principles (e.g., Halpern and Hitchcock, 2015).
Moreover, it has been argued that causal responsibility is a
central component of legal and moral responsibility (Tadros,
2005; Moore, 2009; Lagnado and Gerstenberg, 2017; Usher,
2018). For example, it has been proposed that the degree of
responsibility an agent has toward outcomes of her action
depends on the teleological control that she deploys to achieve
that effect (Lombrozo, 2010; Usher, 2018) and that differences
in robust causation are the source of our feelings of a reduced
responsibility toward manipulated agents (Deery and Nahmias,
2017; Murray and Lombrozo, 2017; Usher, 2018). Future research
needs to test potential dissociations between robustness and skill
and also examine how the attributions of responsibility change
for teleological continual actions, in which the agent acts so
as to carry out compensatory corrections needed to preserve a
goal in the face of perturbations or interventions (Heider, 1958;
Usher, 2018). Future research is also needed to examine potential
distinctions between the causal responsibility of agents for the
outcome of their intended actions (of the types we have examined
here) and judgments of praise or blame.
In sum, robustness is an important but relatively under-
explored causal concept (Woodward, 2006). Convergent
evidence from our current studies, and also from Vasilyeva
et al. (2018) using different experimental paradigms, show that
robustness is itself a robust phenomenon in shaping people’s
causal judgments.
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